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One of the constants of software development is how errors always exist after a product is finished,
even with the most rigorous testing. These errors must be located and fixed in a phase called
debugging phase. Since this phase can be very time consuming and expensive, automating the
process of finding errors is of major importance.
Techniques like Spectrum-based Fault Localization are used to locate errors, but they need
information regarding successful and failed executions. Invariants can help in this regard. By
using invariants to automatically detect errors, the process would be fully automated.
However, this solution still has some drawbacks, mainly due to performance issues. Selecting
only key variables to be monitored, instead of monitoring every variable, could help reduce the
performance loss without any significant reduction in error detection quality.
This thesis proposes the use of two created algorithms to detect the system’s so-called collar
variables, and only monitor these variables. The first pattern finds variables whose value increase
or decrease at regular intervals and deems them not important to monitor. The other pattern veri-
fies the range of a variable per (successful) execution. If the range is constant across executions,
then the variable is not monitored. Experiments were conducted on three different real-world ap-
plications to evaluate the reduction achieved on the number of variables monitored and determine
the quality of the error detection. Results show a reduction of 52.04% on average in the number
of monitored variables, while still maintaining a good detection rate with only 3.21% of execu-





Uma das constantes do desenvolvimento de software é a existência de erros quando o produto está
terminado, mesmo quando submetido ao teste mais rigoroso. Estes erros têm de ser localizados
e corrigidos numa fase chamada fase de depuração (debugging). Como esta fase pode ser muito
extensa e dispendiosa, automatizar o processo de localizar os erros é de extrema importância.
Técnicas como Spectrum-based Fault Localization são usadas para localizar erros, mas ne-
cessitam de informação referente a execuções bem sucedidas e execuções falhadas. Invariantes
podem ajudar neste campo. Com o uso de invariantes para detetar os erros automaticamente, o
processo ficaria completamente automático.
Contudo, esta solução ainda apresenta algumas desvantagens, nomeadamente problemas de
performance. Monitorizar apenas as variáveis chave do sistema em vez e todas as variáveis poderá
tornar reduzir os problemas de performance, sem ter grande impacto na qualidade da deteção de
erros.
Esta tese propõe o uso de dois algoritmos criados para detetar as chamadas collar variables
do sistema, e apenas monitorizar essas variáveis. O primeiro padrão encontra variáveis cujo valor
aumenta ou diminui com intervalos do mesmo tamanho e declara-as como não importantes de
monitorizar. O outro padrão verifica a gama de valores (valor mímino e valor máximo) de uma
variável em cada execução bem sucedida. Se a gama for constante entre todas as execuções, então
a variável não será monitorizada. Foram feitas experiências em três aplicações do mundo real
para avaliar a redução obtida em número de variáveis monitorizadas e determinar o a qualidade da
deteção de erros. Os resultados mostram uma redução média de 52.04% em número de variáveis
monitorizadas, enquanto mantém uma boa qualidade de deteção de erros apresentando apenas
3.21% das execuções com erros não existentes detetados (falsos positivos) e 5.26% das execuções
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The development process of software applications consists of many phases. One of these phases is
the development phase where the application is implemented. To ensure the quality of the product,
this phase usually ends with a thorough testing of the system. However, errors always creep into
the operational phase. To locate and fix these errors, a debugging phase is started. The process of
locating the fault can be very time consuming, depending on the nature of the error. This leads to
a very costly process [Tas02].
In order to reduce the costs, efforts are being made to achieve full automation of the process
of locating errors. Zoltar [JAvG09] is one of the tools created to tackle this issue. It detects errors
by using software constructs called fault screeners and then it uses a technique called Spectrum-
based Fault Localization to find the location of existing errors. Despite that, there are still some
optimization issues on these solutions that need to be addressed.
1.2 Goals
As stated on section 1.1, there are still some issues that need to be addressed in order to make
the use of fault screeners viable for debugging purposes. The main problem is the number of
monitored variables. On larger systems, the overhead generated by monitoring every occurrence
of every variable, makes the application to slow to be used. To reduce the number of variables
checked, it is imperative that the key variables of the system are found. These key variables,
also known as collar variables, are the variables that are responsible for the behavior of the sys-
tem [MOR07]. An exaple of a collar variable would be accumulator on Listing 1.1 as it is a
vital part on the entire program. On the other hand, j should not be considered a collar variable
as it is simply and auxiliary variable of a cycle.
By knowing which these variables are in an automatic way, it is possible to reduce the number
of monitored variables, effectively reducing the overhead.
So to approach this issue, this project aims to add these functionalities to the GZoltar toolset:
1
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1 public int funcExample(int i) {
2 int accumulator = i;
3 for(int j = 0; j < 5; j++) {
4 if(accumulator == 1 && j < 3)
5 j=j+2;
6 accumulator *= accumulator;
7 }
8 int result = accumulator * 3;
9 return result;
10 }
Listing 1.1: Collar Variable example
• Automatic error detection using invariants.
• Detection of the collar variables of a system.
• Use of invariants only on collar variables.
1.3 Structure
In addition to this chapter, this document has four more chapters. On chapter 2, the state of the art
is described. Then on chapter 3 the implementation details of the solution are explained. Chap-
ter 4 shows the results achieved by using the implemented approach. Finally, on chapter 5, the
final conclusions of the document are presented, as well as the predicted future work. Appendix A
contains the publications submitted in the context of this thesis. The first publication was submit-
ted to IJUP’12 and was already approved. The second publication was submitted to ICTSS’12 on
the 18th of June and is currently being reviewed.
2
Chapter 2
State of the Art
In order to fully automate the process of debugging there are two requisites that must be achieved:
• Automatically detect the presence of an error.
• Knowing that an error exists, find it.
One possible way of evaluating the location of an error is the use of Spectrum-based Fault
Localization and with the aid of fault screeners, it is possible to automatically detect the errors,
making the technique fully autonomous.
However some optimization problems still exist with the use of fault screeners, so it is impor-
tant to research the concept of collar variables.
During this chapter, these concepts are explained in greater detail, by providing information
regarding related work done on these areas.
2.1 Spectrum-based Fault Localization
Spectrum-based Fault Localization, also known as SFL, is a probabilistic method for locating
faults within a program. This technique emphasizes on the use of program spectra. A program
spectrum is a profile that contains the information on the sections of code that were run during an
execution of an application. Each of these executions can either pass or fail. Knowing the program
spectrum of an execution and knowing if it passed or failed, a similarity coefficient is obtained that
allows the the ranking of potential fault locations [AZvG07]. The coefficient can be calculated
using various algorithms.
In table 2.1, it is possible to see an example of how SFL works. This example uses the Taran-
tula coefficient [JH05]. The sample program reads three integers and then returns the one with
the middle value. As it can be seen, the line that has the highest coefficient value is line 9. This
means it is the line that has a greater probability of having an error. In this case, line 9 does in fact
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contain a bug as it assigns y to m in two cases: when x < y < z (correctly) and when y < x < z
(incorrectly).
Table 2.1: Spectrum-based Fault Localization example [JH05]
1: mid() { Runs
2: int x,y,z,m; 1 2 3 4 5 6 Result
3: read(“Enter 3 numbers:”,x,y,z); • • • • • • 0.5
4: m = z; • • • • • • 0.5
5: if (y<z) • • • • • • 0.5
6: if (x<y) • • • • 0.63
7: m = y; • 0.0
8: else if (x<z) • • • 0.71
9: m = y; // ***BUG*** • • 0.83
10: else • • 0.0
11: if (x>y) • • 0.0
12: m = y; • 0.0
13: else if (x>z) • 0.0
14: m = x; 0.0
15: print(“Middle number is:”,m); } • • • • • • 0.5
Pass/Fail Status
√ √ √ √ × √
On a more technical note, the program spectra and the information regarding pass/failed exe-
cution can be stored as matrices as shown on Figure 2.1. It is important to note that each run from
the example is represented on each line M of the matrix and each line coverage of the program is
represented by matrix column N. A dot on the figure means that the line was executed during the
run. The more a line coverage is similar to the error detection vector when compared to the other
lines, the greater the result value is.
M spectra
N parts
x11 x12 · · · x1N














Figure 2.1: Spectrum-based Fault Localization matrices [AZvG07]
Each of the values xi j represent a flag that is active when a block j was executed during run i.
Also, ei stores the information whether run i was a passed or failed execution.
2.1.1 Tools
There are some tools that already use SFL to aid developers debugging their applications. One
of these tools is Tarantula [JH05]. This tool stands out for using its own coefficient and having a
4
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graphical interface.
Another noteworthy application is GZoltar [RAR11]. Based on Zoltar [JAvG09], GZoltar adds
fault localization capabilities to the Eclipse IDE as a plug-in, improving the interface. However it
does not possess the automatic error detection capabilities Zoltar had.
2.2 Fault Screeners
As mentioned by Paul Racunas et al.,
“A fault screener is a probabilistic fault tolerance mechanism that uses historical infor-
mation or current processor state to establish a profile of expected behavior, and that
signals a warning when encountering behavior outside of that profile.” [RCMM07,
chap. Perturbation-based Fault Screening]
First used by Ernst et al. [ECGN99], fault screeners, also known as program invariants, are
fault tolerance mechanisms that use historical data recovered from previous executions to deter-
mine the expected behaviour from a system’s variables, issuing a warning when the expected
behaviour is not met [RCMM07].
Hence, these fault screeners can be used to automate error detection. They are used to monitor
the value of a variable during the execution of a program. However, before a fault screener is ready
to detect errors effectively, a training phase is necessary in order to determine the range of values
it should accept [DZ09].
There are various types of invariants, each with its own algorithms for training and error detect-
ing. This leads to different quality results, depending on the type of invariant used on a variable.
2.2.1 Training Phase
During this phase, the valid range of values of a variable is determined. The training is achieved by
updating the values allowed by the fault screener when a behavior is found that goes against that of
past runs. As a consequence, the range of values that are considered valid by a fault screener tends
to become increasingly larger with training. However, this is not the case for all types on fault
screeners. The Extended History Screeners is an example of this, since it has a limited amount of
stored historical data (more information on this type of screeners is present on chapter 2.2.3.1).
To guarantee that the information learned is not erroneous, this training can only be used by
running the software with cases that are known to be working as intended (i.e. runs that produce
the expected results).
2.2.2 Error Detection Phase
After the training phase is complete, the fault screeners now possess the information needed to start
the error detection phase. Errors are detected by monitoring the values that variables have during
the execution and observing deviations from the behavior learned during the previous phase. Such
5
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deviations could be an indication that an error has occurred and so the fault screener warns the
system of that anomaly. For this reason, an effective training is crucial. If the behavior that
the fault screener learned is incorrect, deviations from it can’t be taken as an indicator of a fault
presence.
2.2.3 Types of Fault Screeners
There are several types of fault screeners that have been subject of study. Each has its own ad-
vantages and disadvantages of use, as well as method of training and error detection. This section
is dedicated to explaining five types of screeners according to how they work, training and error
detection algorithms and advantages/disadvantages of their use.
2.2.3.1 Extended History Screener
This type of screener consists on storing the history of the 64 last unique values that a variable has
shown. In addition, 64 deltas between successive values are stored as well. An error is detected
when a variable has a value that is not included on the list of unique values allowed by the screener
and its variation does not match any of the deltas stored.
This screener is characterized by being able to detect minor perturbations on variable values
compared to other screeners. However, its limited history storage does not allow the representation
of variables that have a larger pool of valid values [RCMM07].
2.2.3.2 Dynamic Range Screener
Dynamic Range screeners use segments that contain all valid values recorded during the training
phase to determine if a variable is within its expected behavior. The number of segments created
is variable and each segment represents a range of values that the invariant considers valid. On
Table 2.2 and Table 2.3, it is possible to see how the ranges are updated when a new value occurs
during the training phase.
Table 2.2: Dynamic Range Screener training with one segment






When only one segment is used, its bounds are updating according to the following expres-
sions:
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Table 2.3: Dynamic Range Screener training with two segments






l : = min(l,v) (2.1)
u : = max(u,v) (2.2)
where l is the lower bound, u is the upper bound and v is the value observed from the variable.
In other words, when the observed value is out of bounds of the current range, the segment is
extended to include the new value [AGZvG08b].
With more segments, the process of updating the boundaries is a little different. If the new
value is not contemplated withing the boundaries of any of the segments, an update will be made.
This update will rearrange the segments in a way that the segments allows the smallest possible
set of values, maintaining all the valid values from the previous iteration.
In the error detection phase, the value of a variable is compared with the ranges accepted
by the fault screener. The following expression is used to evaluate if the variable is showing a
perturbation:
violation = ¬(l < v < u) (2.3)
where l is the lower bound, u is the upper bound and v is the value observed from the vari-
able. When more then one segment exists, the variable must be within one of the ranges to be
valid [AGZvG08b].
The main advantage of this type of fault screeners is its ability to represent a large set of valid
values for a variable. However, it suffers from increasing this value set to quickly when adding
values that are distant from the current ranges or when two ranges are merged.
2.2.3.3 Invariance-based Screener
This type of fault screener stores two fields: the first observed value and a bitmask representing
the bits that were altered. In other words if the first observed value was 2 (represented by 0010)
and the next observed value was 3 (represented by 0011), then the value 2 would be saved along
with the bitmask 0001, because only the last bit was altered between the two values.
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During the training phase, the bitmask is updated to accommodate all the changes that were
made to the first value, in a bitwise fashion. The following expression is used to update the
bitmask:
msk = ¬(new⊕ f st)∧msk (2.4)
where msk is the bitmask, new is the currently observed value and f st is the first observed value.
Both the xor and the and operators are bitwise operators [AGZvG08a].
To validate the value of a variable during the error detection phase, another expression is used:
violation = (new⊕ f st)∧msk (2.5)
where msk is the bitmask, new is the currently observed value and f st is the first observed
value. Again both operators are bitwise. When violation is not zero, a perturbation is de-
tected [AGZvG08a].
Invariance-based screeners have a very efficient representing the valid value set, but is limited
in its representation of negative and floating point values. It is also possible to render the screener
useless with only two instructions if the values differ on all their bits [RCMM07].
2.2.3.4 TLB-based Screener
The TLB-based screener has its basis on TLB memory access hits and misses. TLB misses are
regarded as perturbations and accesses that don’t cause a miss are regarded as normal.
This screener is mostly used to locate errors on data-addresses, although it cannot find per-
turbations when these are present on the low-order bits of the address. It can only find faults that
affect the data-addresses [RCMM07].
2.2.3.5 Bloom Filter Screener
This type of screener uses data structures called Bloom filters to maintain the entire set of values
that a variable had during the training phase. A 32-bit value that merges the observed value and the
instruction address is used to store the accepted values. This 32-bit number is defined as follows:
g = (v∗216)∨ (0xFFFF ∧ ia) (2.6)
where v is the observed value and ia is the instruction address. The operators ∨ and ∧ are bitwise
operators [AGZvG08b].
During training, when a new value observed, the number g is hashed on two different functions
(h1 and h2). The hash functions are updated according to the following expressions:
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b[h1(g)] : = 1 (2.7)
b[h2(g)] : = 1 (2.8)
where h1 and h2 are hash functions [AGZvG08b].
After the training phase, to detect errors the following expression is used:
violation = ¬(b[h1(g)]∧b[h2(g)]) (2.9)
where h1 and h2 are hash functions.
The main advantage of this type of screener is the maintaining of the full history that the
variable had during the training phase.
2.2.4 Fault Screener Evaluation Metrics
In order to evaluate the performance of fault screeners, three different metrics are used. The first
of these metrics is fault coverage. This is measured by counting the number of injected errors that
were found. The higher the number of errors detected, the greater the coverage is.
The second metric is the accuracy of the fault screener. This metric is measured by the quantity
of false positives, errors detected that do not exist, encountered during successful executions of a
program. Less false positives means better accuracy.
The last metric is latency, which is the distance the actual error and where it is detected.
These metrics cannot be taken into account separately. For example a fault screener could
have a very high performance if an error is detected on every line, however if the majority of those
errors don’t exist, those would represent false positives, in other words, the fault screener would
have a very low accuracy [RCMM07, AGZvG08a].
One of the challenges for using generic invariants is the accuracy of the error detection, as
with the increase of executions used for training, the rates of false positives and false negatives
differ. The number of false positives tends to decrease, while the number of false negatives, the
non detection of existing errors, increases [AGZvG08b]. This happens because of the increase of
accepted values by the invariant.
Figure 2.2 displays a possible setup for a dynamic range invariant. During the training phase
the invariant learnt that the values between−2 and 2 were the valid set of possible values. However
the real case is that the values should be valid between−3 and−1, as well as 1 and 3. This leads to
some false positives and false negatives. Values observed that withing the ranges [−3,−2[ or ]2,3]
issue a detected error warning, hence they are false positives. Likewise, observations between −1
and 1 do not issue any warnings when they should.
In the same scenario, if the invariant had been subject to more training, then more values would
be added into the accepted range. On Fig. 2.3 the number 4 was such a value. This lead to the
9
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-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Valid Values
Accepted Values by Invariant
False Positives
False Negatives
Figure 2.2: False positive and false negative example
values ranging from 2 to 3 to become valid, eliminating those false positives, but the ones from
3 to 4 also became valid, becoming new false negatives. In other words, there was an increase of
false negatives and decrease of false positives. With more training the false positive rate tends to
lead to 0 because the entire possibility of values become valid.
On the other side, the number of false negatives increases because since it accepts a lot more
values then it should, it does not detect any values outside the huge accepted range.
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Valid Values
Accepted Values by Invariant
False Positives
False Negatives
Figure 2.3: False positive and false negative example with increased training
2.2.5 Quality Comparison
In order to compare the different types of screeners, Paul Racunas et al. made a study where these
fault screeners were used on several benchmarking suites [RCMM07].
As it can be seen in the study’s results, each type of fault screener behaves differently on the
various benchmarks. This is due to the very nature of the screener. Some are more susceptible to
destructive aliasing (i.e. the invariance screener). However, on a more global note, the results are
positive showing a fairly high coverage and very low false positive rates, apart from the TLB-based
screener that shows a much larger false positive rate.
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2.2.6 Tools
There are already applications that generate invariants to monitor the execution of a program.
Among these applications is the toolset called Zoltar [JAvG09]. This application applies a fault
screener on every occurrence of a variable and tries to detect errors by finding perturbations on
their behavior. In addition to detecting errors, Zoltar uses the errors detected to help debugging
using SFL. No type of variable selection optimization is present, which makes its use to slow on
larger applications.
Another tool that works with fault screeners is PRECIS [SAKV11]. PRECIS uses a different
type of invariants based on pre- and post-conditions. However, this application doesn’t offer any
other kind of feature.
DIDUCE [HL02] is yet another application that uses fault screeners. This tool does not gen-
erate invariants automatically, it is the user who must decide where he wants code to be analyzed.
It is used to help debugging Java implemented applications.
Daikon [EPG+07] is a tool that reports likely invariants. It runs a program and then reports
the properties observed during the executions. Besides storing pre-defined invariants like con-
stants, range or linear relationships, it can be extended by the user with new invariant types. It is
compatible with various programming languages, including C, C++, Java and Pearl.
Carrot [PRKR03] is a tool created with the purpose of using generic invariants for fault lo-
calization. It uses a smaller set of invariants then Daikon. The results obtained were negative
which lead to the belief that invariants alone are insuficient as a means of debugging. However,
in [AGZvG08b] the use of invariants for fault localization was successful when used as the input
for the fault localization technique SFL.
IODINE [HCNC05] is a framework for extracting dynamic invariants for hardware designs. It
has been shown that accurate properties can be obtained from using dynamic invariants.
iSWAT [SLR+08] is another framework that uses invariants for error detection of a hardware
level. It uses LLVM to instrument the source code to monitor the store values.
2.3 Collar Variables
Collar Variables is a term used to describe the key variables of a system. According to Tim
Menzies et al. [MOR07] it is curious how software works as even an application with only 300
variables can generate up to 2300 states. This could be because only a sub-set of variables are
responsible for the output of the system and, as such, only those variables need to be monitored to
have control of the system [MOR07].
So if these collar variables are the true of the behavior of software, three things are to be
expected:
• Quick saturation of software testing due to the early execution of all program paths.
• Random mutation testing most probably won’t change the behavior of the program, as it is
more likely to hit non-collar variables then collar variables [MJ96].
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• Clumping of reachable states due to the settings that the collar variables allow [Pel04].
2.3.1 Tools
There are already some tools that try to approach the concept of collar variables. One of these tools
is TAR3, a randomized version of the data-miner TAR2 [MH03]. This tool tries to find the collar
variables of an application by creating different scenarios that allow their identification. There is
also an updated version called TAR4.1.
In [GMDGB10] the algorithms of TAR3 and TAR4.1 are explained. These algorithms allow
to obtain a ranking of “usefulness” of the different components of an application. TAR3 uses the
concepts of lift, the change that a decision makes on a set of examples, and support. TAR4.1 uses
Naive Bayes classifiers for the scoring heuristic in order to obtain an overall better performance in
comparison to TAR3.1.
KEYS [JMF08] is yet another algorithm that tries to discover the collar variables, called keys
by the author. It is used to optimize requirement decisions and is faster then the TAR3 algorithm.
In [GMJ+08], an improved KEYS algorithm is shown called KEYS2. It outperforms the original
version by four orders of magnitude in terms of speed.
The main problem with these approaches is the need to execute the application various times
to obtain the collar variables.
In [WGS03], the concept of collar variable is once again used, this time by the name of
back doors. They were using these back doors to solve CSP/SAT search problems and suggest





In this chapter, some insight on the implementation details of the approached solution is given.
It is divided into four main sections. First a section describing the changes made to the GZoltar
toolset in terms of instrumentation. After that, the invariant structure used is presented and the
following section explains how this invariant management works. Lastly, the variable evolution
pattern detectors are presented.
This was necessary in order to achieve the thesis goals. To add automatic error detection with
invariants, changes to the instrumentation had to be made to make the target program call the
update and validate functions of the invariant. Likewise, the pattern detectors were necessary to
discover variables that are not important to monitor.
As GZoltar is a plug-in for the Eclipse IDE and it works with Java applications, these changes
had to follow the same requirements.
3.1 Instrumentation
The GZoltar toolset already used some degree of instrumentation in order to evaluate the code
coverage of the executed tests. However major changes were needed in order to monitor variables.
All the changes to the instrumentation were made using the ASM4.0 framework. Due to the way
Java variables work, during the execution there is no information regarding the name of the
variables being used, only their stack index. This lead to the first change needed. In order to have
this information, an analysis of the local variable table is required. This table provides data on
the variables including: variable name, the stack index used and the instructions ehen the variable
is associated to the index. During the analysis, when a new variable is encountered during the
training phase, an invariant is created. If the invariant already exists, then the stack index and the
offset of instructions when the variable is used are updated.
Having the invariants created, to one thing that is missing is alter the execution to call the
invariant’s update and validate function. This is accomplished by invoking the invariant manager’s
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update function, when in training mode, or the valitade function in error detection mode (for more
details on these functions check Section 3.3).
3.2 Invariant Structure
Since GZoltar does not have any invariant support, a new data structure had to be devised to
maintain the information relevant the invariant, like learnt information and functions for training
and validation. It also had to incorporate the functions to detect variable patterns (explained in
Section 3.4) and save the pattern information.
Since there are various types of invariants and restraining the implementation to a single type
is not ideal, a hierarchical approach was used. There is a global abstract class called Invariant
that imposes the data that is common to every invariant type. It also implements functions that are
shared by every invariant as well, like the Variable Evolution Pattern Detectors.
Each type of invariant is a subclass of Invariant that implements the functions that, al-
though are common to every invariant, are implemented differently. It also adds variables that
are specific to said invariant. Both dynamic range invariants and bitmask invariants were imple-
mented.
These are the variables that are used by every invariant type and as such are present in class
Invariant:
• className – The class that the variable monitored by invariant belongs to.
• method – The method that the variable monitored by invariant belongs to.
• name – The name of the variable monitored by invariant.
• index – The stack index used by the variable during the execution.
• start – The instruction number of when the variable starts using the designated index.
• end – The instruction number of when the variable stops using the designated index.
• typeDescriptor – The type descriptor of the variable.
• nRuns – Number of executions where the variable is used (pattern detection).
• firstValue – A boolean indicating if the variable has been used before in the current
execution (pattern detection).
• delta – The difference between the last two observed values (pattern detection).
• lastValue – The last observed value during the current execution (pattern detection).
• deltaPattern – Information if the delta pattern was broken (pattern detection).




• upperBoundRun – Highest observed value of the current execution, or of the last execution
(pattern detection).
• rangePattern – Information if the range pattern was broken (pattern detection).
• nVisits – Number of times the invariant was used (pattern detection).
There are also various functions that are common to all invariants. The functions that are
used for pattern detection have the same implementation, however there are other that may need
implementation within the subclass. The functions of Invariant are:
• boolean withinOffset(int offset) – Determines if the offset given allows the
invariant to be used.
• void updateCollarStatus(Object value) – Updates the pattern detection info-
mation with a new value.
• boolean hasPattern() – Indicates if a pattern exists or not.
• void update(Object value) – Updates the information learnt with a new value (re-
quires subclass implementation).
• boolean validate(Object value) – Checks if the value follows the valid para-
maters set by the invariant (requires subclass implementation).
• String invariantToString() – Turns the invariant into a string that is used to save
the invariant (requires subclass implementation).
With this implementation, extension to new invariant types is very accessible, one of the main
goals when this structure was conceived.
3.3 Invariant Management
In addition to the instrumentation and invariant structure, an invariant management system was
required. To accomplish this, the class LoadStoreMaintainerwas created. This class contains
a table that is used to maintain the invariants during the execution. It also implements the save
and load functions of the invariants. There are two load modes, a complete mode that loads all
invariants (used for the training phase) and a collar load mode that only loads the invariants that
did not detect patterns (for error detection mode).
LoadStoreMaintainer also contains an update and a validate function that find what in-
variant that needs to be used, by knowing its stack index and instruction offset, and calls the
invariant’s own update or validate.
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3.4 Variable Evolution Pattern Detectors
In order to know what variables need to be monitored and which can be discarted, two diferent de-
tectors were created. Each detector tries to enconter its own pattern on the evolution of a variable’s
value. When the detector sees that the pattern is broken, then the variable is marked as important
to be monitored.
These patterns were designed to be as simple as possible, while still detecting constants and
other variables, like counters. It is important to note that a variable is never classified as not
important to monitor if it was only used on one execution of the system.
3.4.1 Delta Oriented Pattern Detector
The Delta Oriented Pattern Detector is the first of two algorithms created to detect collar variables.
With this detector, the main objective is to discover variables that throughout its life cycle evolve in
a constant fashion. These variables are then deemed not essencial since during every execution its
value increases or decreases in the same manner, no matter what the input is. This is accomplished
by using a delta value (∆), that is the difference between the last value observed and the current
one:
∆ := current value− last value if last value 6= /0 (3.1)
∆ := 0 if last value = /0 (3.2)
Algorithm 1 demonstrates how this detector can determine which variables are important to
monitor. Every variable in the system has a ∆ associated to it. During the training phase, when
the first value is observed, ∆ is given the value 0 and the last value is updated to the observed one.
On the next observation, ∆ will be updated accordingly, using the current value and the last value,
as seen in Line 9. After this, the pattern detection begins. With each observation, an updated
∆ is generated (∆2) and is compared to the current ∆. If the new ∆ is equal to the current one,
the pattern detection continues as the evolution of the variable remains the same. In case the ∆
is different, since the pattern is broken, a flag is stored indicating that this pattern does not exist
for the variable being evaluated. There is, however, an exception to this. When the new ∆ is 0,
then it is not compared to the previous ∆ (Lines 13 and 24). This is done because variables can be
accessed without their values being changed.
After each execution, the value of ∆ is saved along with a flag indicating whether the pattern
was broken or not. Subsequent executions use the ∆ from the first execution and starts the pattern
detection after the first two values, instead of after the third like the first run.
With this detector it is possible to detect constant values (∆ = 0), as well as counters and loop
variables that always increment/decrement with the same pace. A good example of this is the
Java code present on Listing 3.1. Of all the variables from this small code sample, j is the one
that has the least impact on the outcome. It only serves as an auxiliary variable for the loop.
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Algorithm 1 Delta Oriented Pattern Detector
1: pattern := true
2: for all Execution do
3: for all Observation do
4: if nRuns = 0 then
5: if first observation then
6: ∆ := 0
7: LastValue := ObservedValue
8: else if second observation then
9: ∆ := ObservedValue−LastValue
10: else
11: ∆2 := ObservedValue−LastValue
12: LastValue := ObservedValue
13: if ∆ 6= ∆2
∧
∆2 6= 0 then




18: if first observation then
19: ∆ := 0
20: LastValue := ObservedValue
21: else
22: ∆2 := ObservedValue−LastValue
23: LastValue := ObservedValue
24: if ∆ 6= ∆2
∧
∆2 6= 0 then







The delta oriented pattern detector can be used to mark this variable as not essencial. It does
not matter what the input of this function is, because j will always increment in the same manner.
∆ will always be 1 (j always starts with the value 0 and increments by one on every access), so
the pattern is never broken.
3.4.2 Range Oriented Pattern Detector
One of the main differences between this pattern and the previous one is that the range oriented
pattern detector requires one full execution before it can determine a broken pattern. The basis of
this detector is that if the range of values that a variable has between every run is the same, then
it is not important to monitor. This is what happens on Listing 3.2 where in every execution j has
values with the range [0,5]. This is the reason why one full execution is required. The detector
only has the range of the full execution at the end of it.
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1 public int funcExample(int i) {
2 int accumulator = i;
3 for(int j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
4 if(accumulator == 1)
5 break;
6 accumulator *= accumulator;
7 }
8 int result = accumulator * 3;
9 return result;
10 }
Listing 3.1: Delta Detector code example
The functions of updating the bounds of the range are the same as the dynamic range invariant:
l := min(l,v) (3.3)
u := max(u,v) (3.4)
The main difference between the dynamic range invariant and the range oriented pattern detec-
tor is that the bounds of the detector are only updated on the first execution that a variable appears
in. On the following executions, every time a new value is observed, it is determined if it is within
the range of the first execution:
broken = ¬(l < v < u) (3.5)
Algorithm 2 shows how the detector works. During the first execution (Lines 4 and 5) the
range is constantly updated with every observation of a given variable. Once the first execution is
over, the pattern detector is ready to discover a pattern. Hence, on the following executions, each
observed value is compared to the pattern detector range, as seen in Line 7. If the new value is
not within the range determined by the first execution, then the pattern was broken. If this never
happens then it is determined that there is a pattern in the execution and the variable will not be
monitored during the error detection phase.
With this detector it is possible to detect variables that although do not evolve in a linear way
that can be detected by the delta oriented pattern detector, are restricted in some way during the
execution. This is the case of loop variables that are affected within the cycle. This can be seen
in the example shown on the example shown on Listing 3.2. In this case, variable j is not a
very important variable to be monitored. Taking into account the previous, detector, it is easy to
understand that it would not be marked as not essencial (as ∆ can be both 1 or 2). However the
range oriented detector can find a pattern. On every execution, despite what input is received, the
range of values j takes is always [0,5]. During the first execution, this range would be given to
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Algorithm 2 Range Oriented Pattern Detector
1: pattern := true
2: for all Execution do
3: for all Observation do
4: if nRuns = 0 then
5: updatePatternRange(ObservedValue)
6: else
7: if ObservedValue /∈ PatternRange then






the pattern detector and the following runs would follow the pattern, so the variable would not be
monitored.
1 public int funcExample(int i) {
2 int accumulator = i;
3 for(int j = 0; j < 5; j++) {
4 if(accumulator == 1 && j < 3)
5 j=j+2;
6 accumulator *= accumulator;
7 }
8 int result = accumulator * 3;
9 return result;
10 }






In this section the experimental setup is presented, along with the workflow of the experiments
themselves. After that the experimental results are discussed.
4.1 Experimental Setup
4.1.1 Application Set.
During the experimentation, three real world applications were used:
• NanoXML 1 - a XML parser.
• org.jacoco.report 2 - a report generator for the JaCoCo library.
• XML-Security - a XML signature and encryption library from the Apache Santuario 3
project.
On Table 4.1 some details of the applications used are shown. These details include the number
of lines of code and the number of test cases.
Table 4.1: Application details




NanoXML is a free, easy to use and non-GUI based and non-validating XML parser for Java.
It has three different components:
• NanoXML/Java, the main standard parser.
1NanoXML – http://devkix.com/nanoxml.php
2JaCoCo – http://www.eclemma.org/jacoco/index.html
3Apache Santuario – http://santuario.apache.org/
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• NanoXML/SAX, an SAX adapter for the standard parser.
• NanoXML/Lite, an extremely small version of the parser with limited funcionality.
NanoXML is available under the zlib/libpng license, which is Open Source compliant.
JaCoCo is an open source code coverage library for Java, being developed by EclEmma. The
current goal of JaCoCo is to provide a code coverage library that is able to provide coverage
reports. To do this there is a bundle called org.jacoco.report. This bundle is able to provide
reports in three formats:
• HTML, for end users.
• XML, to be processed by external tools.
• CSV, suitable for graph creation.
XML-Security is one of the libraries available on the Apache Santuario project, a project
that aims at providing security standards for XML. It is distributed under the Apache Licence
Version 2.0 which is compatible with other open source licenses. The XMLSecurity data format
provides encryption and decryption XML payloads at different levels, namely Document, Ele-
ment and Element Content. XPath can be used for multi-node encryption/decryption. There exist
two versions of XML-Security: a Java one and a C++ one. The Java version is used for the
experiments.
4.1.2 Workflow of Experiments.
In order to determine if the pattern detectors were effective at reducing the number of instrumented
points and if the error detection maintained a good quality, the system’s variables is subject to
training first. Each application is instrumented in order to train the fault screeners. This training
is achieved by executing a random number of test case (roughly 50% of the tests in the original
suite) of the target program. We did not use the complete suite in order not to influence the results
positively.
Once the training of the fault screeners is complete, the error detection phase begins. To eval-
uate the quality of the error detection, each application is executed five times. On each execution a
different bug is inserted into the code and the number of false positives and false negatives are col-
lected. An additional execution is performed without any inserted bug to determine the execution
time in a regular scenario. Each application’s test suite was executed without any instrumentation
as well to determine the increase of time the instrumentation brings.
Figure 4.1 shows how each phase behaves during the experiment. Before the training phase,
when the application is compiling, the code is instrumented using the ASM4.0 framework. Once
instrumented, the altered application can be used on the next phase. During this next phase, the
training phase, the test are executed with the instrumented code. Everytime a variable is used,
the update function of the screener is called in order to update the accepted values. In addition,
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the screener uses the pattern detectors to detect broken patterns. At the end of the execution,
both the invariant and the data collected from the detector are saved. On the operational phase
the test cases are executed with the instrumented code once again. However, this time instead of
monitoring every variable, only the variables that did not have a detected pattern are observed. On


























Figure 4.1: Workflow of experiments
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Injected bugs are of different types to guarantee a more varied input. Some examples of
inserted bugs are:
• Change an operator when assigning values (i.e. change + to −).
• Change a random numeric value.
• Change comparation operator of a conditional clause (i.e. change a > to < on an if clause).
• Change the value of an argument of a function call.
These bugs where inserted on random parts of each program, with the only caution being
affecting a numerical value since implemented invariants are unable to monitor non numerical
values. With this setup the expected results are:
• Value of the reduction obtained in the number of used invariants.
• Comparison of execution times between executions with and without instrumentation.
• Accuracy of the error detection with the use of pattern detectors.
4.2 Results
Table 4.2 shows the number of variables that were trained and the number of variables that are
considered collar variables by the pattern detectors. It is important to note that only numerical
variables are subjected to training, in other words, only variables of the types int, long, double
and float.
Table 4.2: Variable reduction
Subject Variables trained Collar Variables Reduction
NanoXML 40 17 57.5%
org.jacoco.report 55 28 49.09%
XML-Security 325 164 49.54%
On average, a reduction of 52.04% is achieved with the use of the two pattern detectors.
However the execution time of the program with instrumentation is also important to take into
consideration. Table 4.3 presents the execution times of the test suites both with and without
instrumentation.
The average increase in the execution time is 135.8%. Although this seems like a high value,
it is greatly impacted by the increase noticed on NanoXML that is only a few miliseconds.
Having the data on the reduction of variables monitored and execution time increase, the qual-
ity of the error detection is what remains. To test the quality of the detection using these collar
variabes, the number of false positives (N f p) and false negatives (N f n) was determined. Recall that
a false positive is considered when the fault screener detects an error in the execution that does not
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Table 4.3: Execution time increase
Subject Execution time with Execution time without Increaseinstrumentation (ms) instrumentation (ms)
NanoXML 270 827 206.3%
org.jacoco.report 3469 5162 48.8%
XML-Security 25005 63088 152.3%
Table 4.4: False positive ( fp) and false negative rate ( fn) for bugs 1, 2 and 3
Subject Bug 1 Bug 2 Bug 3
fp fn fp fn fp fn
NanoXML 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
org.jacoco.report 0% 0% 3.4% 2.13% 3.4% 0%
XML-Security 2.81% 0.21% 13.64% 7.14% 1.95% 0.22%
Table 4.5: False positive ( fp) and false negative rate ( fn) for bugs 4 and 5
Subject Bug 4 Bug 5
fp fn fp fn
NanoXML 0% 66.67% 0% 0%
org.jacoco.report 3.83% 2.13% 5.96% 0%
XML-Security 12.99% 0.22% 0.22% 0.22%
exist. Likewise, a false negative is counted when a faulty execution has no objections raised from
any fault screener.
The results shown on Tables 4.4 and 4.5 were obtained by comparing the total number of false










With an average of 3.21% rate of false positives and 5.26% rate of false negatives, the rate of
these false results is considerably low, especially on the smaller applications. On the largest ap-
plication, XML-Security, although having a higher rate of false results, the worst case scenario
detected was a 13.64% fp and 7.14% fn.
Lastly, in order to determine how well these collar variables can be used on Spectrum-based
Fault Localization, the Ochiai coeficient obtained on each bug inserted is shown on Tables 4.6 and
4.7 for the runs with no instrumentation and on Tables 4.8 and 4.9 for the runs with instrumenta-
tion. The number of lines required to inspect in order to find the bug is also present. This number
actually represents the ranking that the bug had on the list with the Ochiai of every element. It can
be noted that excluding very few cases, the required amount of lines that a programmer needs to
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inspect and the Ochiai coeficient, the SFL similarity coefient used on GZoltar, obtained are very
similar when using the solution with invariants when compared with the one without invariants.
Table 4.6: Ochiai results for bugs 1, 2 and 3 without instrumentation
Subject Bug 1 Bug 2 Bug 3Ochiai Rank Ochiai Rank Ochiai Rank
NanoXML 1 153 0.29 543 0.94 9
org.jacoco.report 0.97 16 0.71 3 0.71 3
XML-Security 0.83 3 0.84 35 0.89 9
Table 4.7: Ochiai results for bugs 4 and 5 without instrumentation
Subject Bug 4 Bug 5Ochiai Rank Ochiai Rank
NanoXML 0.93 53 0.47 243
org.jacoco.report 0.75 1 0.58 10
XML-Security 0.83 5 0.93 3
Table 4.8: Ochiai results for bugs 1, 2 and 3 with instrumentation
Subject Bug 1 Bug 2 Bug 3Ochiai Rank Ochiai Rank Ochiai Rank
NanoXML 1 153 0.29 543 0.94 9
org.jacoco.report 0.97 16 0 0 0.75 7
XML-Security 0.99 3 0.92 145 1 9
Table 4.9: Ochiai results for bugs 4 and 5 with instrumentation
Subject Bug 4 Bug 5Ochiai Rank Ochiai Rank
NanoXML 0.27 1634 0.47 243
org.jacoco.report 0.11 491 0.73 19
XML-Security 1 5 1 3
In conclusion, with only the use of two pattern detectors, the decrease of used invariants is
quite significant and the error detection quality remains very high, appart from some special cases.
The quality of the fault localization does not seem to be affected a lot (save for some exceptions).
However, in terms of execution time, the obtained results may still not be enough to allow their
use on real world markets, but perhaps the creation of even more detectors could be a solution.
4.3 Threats to Validity
The main threat to the validity of these results is the fact that only three test subjects were used
during the experimentation. Despite these subjects being real world applications being diverse in
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both the size of the application (lines of code) and size of the test suite, the limited number of sub-
jects implies that not all types of system’s are tested. This means that a system with characteristics
that are completly different might present different results. Another threat is that the number of
injected bugs is not enough to lead to accurate results, as these bugs might simply be “lucky bugs”
that intercept a collar variable.
Naturally, there are also threats that are based on the implementation of the invariants, the
instrumentation or the pattern detector algorithms themselves. The reduce these threats, additional






Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Conclusions
5.1.1 State of the Art
In sum, although there are already attempts at automating debugging with the use of fault screen-
ers, it is still not effective due to the large overhead of the current solution, monitoring every
variable on the system. The use of the concept of collar variables could prove invaluable to solv-
ing this problem, as by using fault screeners only on collar variables would enable a much lighter
execution of the applications. However, current collar variable detection algorithms at the moment
require multiple executions, which is not the ideal situation when the objective is to be integrated
in the testing phase.
5.1.2 Empirical Results
In this paper two simple detectors were used to evaluate what were the collar variables of each of
the systems. Experimenting on real world applications led to a more accurate take on the impact
of the use of invariants for error detection. By only using two detectors, the reduction of number
of invariants used was above 50% while still maintaining good quality detection. Still the increase
in execution time might still be too severe for use and the inability of the detectors to view patterns
on non numeric values is still an obstacle.
These results were submitted in a paper for ICTSS’12. The publication is available on Ap-
pendix A.
5.2 Future Work
For future work in order to reduce the overhead, a further decrease in the number of invariants
used is necessary. The study of additional detectors that would filter even more variables. Another
option is the use of an algorithm similar to the one used on TAR4.1 [GMDGB10] to make the
decision of what variables to monitor.
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Futher work will also be invested in tackling one of the main issues of the current approach,
the ability to only evaluate numeric variables. Efforts will be made to use invariants and create de-
tectors that would evaluate patterns for other variable types like String or char. These variables
may prove invaluable to increasing the effectiveness of this method. With a proper algorithm for
converting String to int, it would be possible to use current invariants and produce detectors
for these data types easier.
By investing work into this area, high error detection rates could be achieved and the impact
on performance greatly reduced paving the way for self-healing systems.
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Despite all efforts made during the development phase to test the application thoroughly,
errors always creep to the operational phase. To fix these errors, a debugging phase is
required, where the faults are located and fixed. This, however, is a costly process [1] and
locating faults can be a very difficult task. Automating the process of locating the root
cause of observed failures is one of the possible ways to reduce the cost of debbuging.
In order to address this issue, tools like Zoltar [2] were developed. Through the use
of generic invariants, also known as screeners, it is possible to predict the location of a
faulty code segment, using Spectrum-based Fault Localization [3]. These fault screeners
are software constructs that detect errors on the values of variables [4].
However this method presents some obstacles to its use on real applications. Using a fault
screener on all occurences of every variable creates an immense overhead. To reduce this
overhead, it is necessary to decrease the number of instrumented points on the code. To
achieve this, a possible solution would be to discover what are the collar variables of the
system and only monitor those variables. According to Tim Menzies [5], collar variables
are the key variables of the system that truly influence its behavior.
Another situation faced when using screeners is the accuracy of the results given by the
screeners. Fault screeners are prone to produce erroneous results. These results can either
be false positives, when an unexistant error is detected, or false negatives, when no error
is detected in the presence of one. This happens because of the training screeners must
go through during testing of the development phase. Since each passed test increases
the range of values that the screener allows, the number of tests affects the rate of false
positives and false negatives [3]. So, it is necessary to know the training a screener needs,
to provide the most accurate results.
With this work it is expected the implementation of a lightweight prototype capable of
detecting the collar variables of a system under test and evaluating when the instrumented
screeners for those variables have received enough training to be used. By achieving
these goals, it is expected to make the use of fault screeners for automatic software fault
localization a viable option.
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Abstract. Although proven to be an effective way for detecting errors,
generic program invariants (also known as fault screeners) entail a con-
siderable runtime overhead, rendering them not useful in practice. This
paper studies the impact of using simple variable patterns to detect the
so-called system’s collar variables to reduce number of variables to be
monitored (instrumented). Two different patterns were investigated to
determine which variables to monitor. The first pattern finds variables
whose value increase or decrease at regular intervals and deems them not
important to monitor. The other pattern verifies the range of a variable
per (successful) execution. If the range is constant across executions, then
the variable is not monitored. Experiments were conducted on three dif-
ferent real-world applications to evaluate the reduction achieved on the
number of variables monitored and determine the quality of the error
detection. Results show a reduction of 52.04% on average in the number
of monitored variables, while still maintaining a good detection rate with
only 3.21% of executions detecting non-existing errors (false positives)
and 5.26% not detecting an existing error (false negatives).
Keywords. Error detection, program invariants, automatic oracles, dy-
namic execution
1 Introduction
An application’s development phase is usually restricted by the budget allowed
for development and/or time-to-market. These restrictions provide a trade-off
with the reliability of the system, which leads to an increase of defects that
can lead to catastrophic results. In these cases proper error detection is vital in
order to ensure the recognition and recovery from faults during the deployment
phase as soon as possible [1]. One possible way of implementing error detection
on a system is with the use of generic invariants, also known as fault screeners.
They may present a higher rate of false positives (faults detected when none
exist) and false negatives (the non detection of an error) when compared to
hard coded error detection methods (such as asserts), due to the latter detecting
anticipated faults. Despite this, generic invariants have the great benefict of being
generated and intrumented automatically into the code. This along with the fact
that (1) the invariants need to be trained during the testing phase and (2) hard
coded solutions are cumbersome and time consuming to implement, might give
an edge to generic invariants. Having generated automatically the invariants
and trained them during the testing phase, they are ready for being used during
the deployment phase, where the invariant detects deviations from the learned
behaviour [2]. Generic invariants have been subject of study for many years,
spawning various types like range screeners, bitmask screeners, and screeners
that leverage Bloom filters [2, 3]. They are mostly used for fault localization [4]
and error detection [3].
Despite the benefits of generic invariants, their use on real-world, large soft-
ware applications is currently impeded by the overhead that monitoring all the
system’s variables requires. However, monitoring every variable may not be re-
quired, as only a subset of variables, known as collar variables, trully affect
the outcome of a system in a meaningful way [5]. Applications like TAR3 and
TAR4.1 have some algorithms that already experiment on this notion [6], but
the use of these collar variables has not been studied on the field of reducing the
number of generic invariants needed to monitor a system effectively.
To tackle this, two algorithms were devised to detect exectution patterns of
variables both during executions and between them. These algorithms, called
variable evolution pattern detectors in this paper, are executed during the train-
ing phase of the invariants and collect information from successful executions.
During the operational phase, when the impact of the instrumentation overhead
needs to be minimized, the data collected from the pattern detectors allows
variables deemed unimportant to be ignored.
This paper makes the following contributions:
– Proposes two methods to detect variables that do not require monitoring (in
other words, methods to detect the collar variables of the program under
analysis).
– Investigates the reduction achieved on the number of used invariants on real
world applications.
– Evaluates the quality of the error detection when comparing with the results
obtained using the test suite of the applications.
– Reports the increase in execution time with the use of the invariants.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a quick overwiew of how a
fault screener works, along with a more detailed explanation of the used screener
for the study, the dynamic range screener. In Sect. 3 explains the functioning of
the two variable evolution pattern detectors. The experimental setup and results
are shown in Sect. 4. Section 5 presents work related to this paper. Finally Sect. 6
gives some final thoughts and some insight on future work.
2 Fault Screeners
First used by Ernst et al. [7], fault screeners, also known as program invariants,
are fault tolerance mechanisms that use historical data recovered from previous
executions to determine the expected behaviour from a system’s variables, is-
suing a warning when the expected behaviour is not met [2]. Hence, the use of
fault sceeners is a possible way to achieve automatic error detecting by monitor-
ing the system’s variables. However, for the detection to be effective, a training
phase is required. During this phase the spectrum of valid variable values is
determined. This constitutes the expected behaviour for a variable that should
raise a warning in case a value that does not fit the spectrum is detected [8].
Formally, screeners are not effective at detecting errors that involve the use of
random values, or variables that store things like current timestamp.
There are various types of invariants, each with its own algorithms for train-
ing and error detecting. In this paper it is focused on the dynamic range in-
variants [2], due to its simplistic nature, reduced overhead, and known to work
in practice [4]. The dynamic range invariant stores the bounds of valid variable
values. During the training phase, when a new value is found, the range of values
allowed by the screener is extended according to the following equations:
l := min(l, v) (1)
u := max(u, v) (2)
If the new value is lower than the lower bound l, the lower bound is updated.
Likewise, if the value is greater than the upper bound u, that bound is updated.
Table 1 shows an example of how the training works for the dynamic range
screener. At first the invariant does not consider any value valid since no ob-
servation was made yet. After the first observation, in this case 5, both bounds
need to be updated leading to a valid range of [5, 5]. The second observation
is a 72. This value is greater then the upper bound of the range and not lower
then the lower bound, so the upper bound is updated. With an updated range
of [5, 72], the new observed value 6 is compared to both bounds. It is between
the upper bound and lower bound so no change is made. Lastly, the value 5004
is observed, again greater then the upper bound. This bound is updated leading
to a final valid range of [5, 5004].
Table 1. Dynamic Range Screener training






When on error detection phase, every observed value is checked against the
range of values allowed by the invariant. If the value goes outside the range of
permitted values, a violation to the expected behaviour is detected:
violation = ¬(l < v < u) (3)
The dynamic range invariant can use a larger number of ranges in order
to restrict the allowed spectrum [2]. While the concept is the same, additional
ranges require more memory and more execution time. When using more then
one range, the objective during the training phase is: when a new value is ob-
served, the updated range is the one that increases the valid spectrum by the
least amount of values. Table 2 shows an example of a dynamic range invariant
with two ranges. The invariant begins with two empty ranges. Once it observes
the value 5, one of the ranges becomes [5, 5]. On the second observed value, 72,
since there is still one range that is empty, that range becomes, [72, 72]. Now
that both ranges, when new values are observed, the invariant tries to make the
ranges as short as possible to learn the least amount of unseen values. When 6
appears, there would be two range choices, [5, 6] and [72, 72] or [5, 5] and [6, 72].
Since the first has the smaller ranges, this is the selected option. The last value
5004 provides an interesting twist. At first glance it would seem that this update
would lead to [5, 6] and [72, 5004], however that is not the case. The ranges are
actually updated to [5, 72] and [5004, 5004]. This happens because the amount
of values that is learnt is a lot smaller (from 6 to 72 compared to from 72 to
5004) and it still guarantees both the acceptance of the values from the values
before the update and the new value observed. In this paper, the only version of
the dynamic range invariant used is the single range one.
Table 2. Dynamic Range Screener training with two segments
New Result Value Range Point 1 Range Point 2
5 ∅ ∅
72 [5, 5] ∅
6 [5, 5] [72, 72]
5004 [5, 6] [72, 72]
[5, 72] [5004, 5004]
One of the challenges for using generic invariants is the accuracy of the error
detection, as with the increase of executions used for training, the rates of false
positives and false negatives differ. The number of false positives, errors detected
that do not exist, tends to decrease, while the number of false negatives, the non
detection of existing errors, increases [9]. This happens because of the increase
of accepted values by the invariant.
Figure 1 displays a possible setup for a dynamic range invariant. During the
training phase the invariant learnt that the values between −2 and 2 were the
valid set of possible values. However the real case is that the values should be
valid between−3 and−1, as well as 1 and 3. This leads to some false positives and
false negatives. Values observed that withing the ranges [−3,−2[ or ]2, 3] issue
a detected error warning, hence they are false positives. Likewise, observations
between −1 and 1 do not issue any warnings when they should.
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Valid Values
Accepted Values by Invariant
False Positives
False Negatives
Fig. 1. False positive and false negative example
In the same scenario, if the invariant had been subject to more training, then
more values would be added into the accepted range. On Fig. 2 the number 4
was such a value. This lead to the values ranging from 2 to 3 to become valid,
eliminating those false positives, but the ones from 3 to 4 also became valid,
becoming new false negatives. In other words, there was an increase of false
negatives and decrease of false positives. With more training the false positive
rate tends to lead to 0 because the entire possibility of values become valid.
On the other side, the number of false negatives increases because since it
accepts a lot more values then it should, it does not detect any values outside
the huge accepted range.
Note that there are other types of invariants, each with their own behaviour
regarding accuracy of error detection and performance [4]. Among them are
bitmask invariants, which use a bitmask with the bits that were changed during
the training when compared with the first observed value. Another one is the
Bloom filter, an invariant that saves the entire history of values observed during
the training phase. In this paper, the results were obtained by only using the
dynamic range invariant. However the approach proposed is easily extensible to
other invariant types.
3 Variable Evolution Pattern Detectors
In this section, the two methods created to detect patterns on the variable values
are presented. These patterns were designed to be as simple as possible, while
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Valid Values
Accepted Values by Invariant
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False Negatives
Fig. 2. False positive and false negative example with increased training
still detecting constants and other variables, like counters. It is important to
note that a variable is never classified as not important to monitor if it was only
used on one execution of the system.
3.1 Delta Oriented Pattern Detector
The Delta Oriented Pattern Detector is the first of two algorithms created to
detect collar variables. With this detector, the main objective is to discover
variables that throughout its life cycle evolve in a constant fashion. This is
accomplished by using a delta value (∆), that is the difference between the last
value observed and the current one:
∆ := current value− last value if last value 6= ∅ (4)
∆ := 0 if last value = ∅ (5)
Algorithm 1 demonstrates how this detector can determine which variables
are important to monitor. Every variable in the system has a ∆ associated to it.
During the training phase, when the first value is observed, ∆ is given the value
0 and the last value is updated to the observed one. On the next observation, ∆
will be updated accordingly, using the current value and the last value, as seen
in Line 9. After this, the pattern detection begins. With each observation, an
updated ∆ is generated (∆2) and is compared to the current ∆. If the new ∆ is
equal to the current one, the pattern detection continues as the evolution of the
variable remains the same. In case the ∆ is different, since the pattern is broken,
a flag is stored indicating that this pattern does not exist for the variable being
evaluated. There is, however, an exception to this. When the new ∆ is 0, then
it is not compared to the previous ∆ (Lines 13 and 24). This is done because
variables can be accessed without their values being changed.
After each execution, the value of ∆ is saved along with a flag indicating
whether the pattern was broken or not. Subsequent executions use the ∆ from
Algorithm 1 Delta Oriented Pattern Detector
1: pattern := true
2: for all Execution do
3: for all Observation do
4: if nRuns = 0 then
5: if first observation then
6: ∆ := 0
7: LastV alue := ObservedV alue
8: else if second observation then
9: ∆ := ObservedV alue− LastV alue
10: else
11: ∆2 := ObservedV alue− LastV alue
12: LastV alue := ObservedV alue
13: if ∆ 6= ∆2
∧
∆2 6= 0 then




18: if first observation then
19: ∆ := 0
20: LastV alue := ObservedV alue
21: else
22: ∆2 := ObservedV alue− LastV alue
23: LastV alue := ObservedV alue
24: if ∆ 6= ∆2
∧
∆2 6= 0 then







the first execution and starts the pattern detection after the first two values,
instead of after the third like the first run.
With this detector it is possible to detect constant values (∆ = 0), as well
as counters and loop variables that always increment/decrement with the same
pace. A good example of this is the Java code present on Fig. 3. Of all the
variables from this small code sample, j is the one that has the least impact on
the outcome. It only serves as an auxiliary variable for the loop.
The delta oriented pattern detector can be used to mark this variable as
not essencial. It does not matter what the input of this function is, because j
will always increment in the same manner. ∆ will always be 1 (j always starts
with the value 0 and increments by one on every access), so the pattern is never
broken.
public int funcExample ( int i ) {
int accumulator = i ;
for ( int j = 0 ; j < 3 ; j++) {
i f ( accumulator == 1)
break ;
accumulator ∗= accumulator ;
}
int r e s u l t = accumulator ∗ 3 ;
return r e s u l t ;
}
Fig. 3. Delta Detector code example
3.2 Range Oriented Pattern Detector
One of the main differences between this pattern and the previous one is that
the range oriented pattern detector requires one full execution before it can
determine a broken pattern. The basis of this detector is that if the range of
values that a variable has between every run is the same, then it is not important
to monitor. This is the reason why one full execution is required. The detector
only has the range of the full execution at the end of it.
The functions of updating the bounds of the range are the same as the
dynamic range invariant:
l := min(l, v) (6)
u := max(u, v) (7)
The main difference between the dynamic range invariant and the range
oriented pattern detector is that the bounds of the detector are only updated
on the first exectution that a variables appears in. On the following executions,
every time a new value is observed, it is determined if it is within the range of
the first execution:
broken = ¬(l < v < u) (8)
Algorithm 2 shows how the detector works. During the first execution (Lines 4
and 5) the range is constantly updated with every observation of a given variable.
Once the first execution is over, the pattern detector is ready to discover a
pattern. Hence, on the following executions, each observed value is compared to
the pattern detector range, as seen in Line 7. If the new value is not within the
range determined by the first execution, then the pattern was broken. If this
never happens then it is determined that there is a pattern in the execution and
the variable will not be monitored during the error detection phase.
With this detector it is possible to detect variables that although do not
evolve in a linear way that can be detected by the delta oriented pattern detector,
Algorithm 2 Range Oriented Pattern Detector
1: pattern := true
2: for all Execution do
3: for all Observation do
4: if nRuns = 0 then
5: updatePatternRange(ObservedV alue)
6: else
7: if ObservedV alue /∈ PatternRange then






are restricted in some way during the execution. This is the case of loop variables
that are affected within the cycle. This can be seen in the example shown on
the example shown on Fig. 4. In this case, variable j is not a very important
variable to be monitored. Taking into account the previous, detector, it is easy to
understand that it would not be marked as not essencial (as ∆ can be both 1 or
2). However the range oriented detector can find a pattern. On every execution,
despite what input is received, the range of values j takes is always [0, 5]. During
the first execution, this range would be given to the pattern detector and the
following runs would follow the pattern, so the variable would not be monitored.
public int funcExample ( int i ) {
int accumulator = i ;
for ( int j = 0 ; j < 5 ; j++) {
i f ( accumulator == 1 && j < 3)
j=j +2;
accumulator ∗= accumulator ;
}
int r e s u l t = accumulator ∗ 3 ;
return r e s u l t ;
}
Fig. 4. Range Detector code example
4 Empirical Results
In this section the experimental setup is presented, along with the workflow of
the experiments themselves. After that the experimental results are discussed.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Application Set. During the experimentation, three real world applications
were used:
– NanoXML 1 - a XML parser.
– org.jacoco.report 2 - a report generator for the JaCoCo library.
– XML-Security - a XML signature and encryption library from the Apache
Santuario 3 project.
On Table 3 some details of the applications used are shown. These details
include the number of lines of code and the number of test cases.
Table 3. Application details




NanoXML is a free, easy to use and non-GUI based and non-validating XML
parser for Java. It has three different components:
– NanoXML/Java, the main standard parser.
– NanoXML/SAX, an SAX adapter for the standard parser.
– NanoXML/Lite, an extremely small version of the parser with limited fun-
cionality.
NanoXML is available under the zlib/libpng license, which is Open Source
compliant.
JaCoCo is an open source code coverage library for Java, being developed
by EclEmma. The current goal of JaCoCo is to provide a code coverage library
that is able to provide coverage reports. To do this there is a bundle called
org.jacoco.report. This bundle is able to provide reports in three formats:
– HTML, for end users.
– XML, to be processed by external tools.
– CSV, suitable for graph creation.
XML-Security is one of the libraries available on the Apache Santuario
project, a project that aims at providing security standards for XML. It is dis-
tributed under the Apache Licence Version 2.0 which is compatible with other
open source licenses. The XMLSecurity data format provides encryption and
1 NanoXML – http://devkix.com/nanoxml.php
2 JaCoCo – http://www.eclemma.org/jacoco/index.html
3 Apache Santuario – http://santuario.apache.org/
decryption XML payloads at different levels, namely Document, Element and
Element Content. XPath can be used for multi-node encryption/decryption.
There exist two versions of XML-Security: a Java one and a C++ one. The
Java version is used for the experiments.
Workflow of Experiments. In order to determine if the pattern detectors
were effective at reducing the number of instrumented points and if the error
detection maintained a good quality, the system’s variables is subject to trainig
first. Each application is instrumented in order to train the fault screeners. This
training is achieved by executing a random number of test case (roughly 50%
of the tests in the original suite) of the target program. We did not use the
complete suite in order not to influence the results positively.
Once the training of the fault screeners is complete, the error detection phase
begins. To evaluate the quality of the error detection, each application is exe-
cuted five times. On each execution a different bug is inserted into the code and
the number of false positives and false negatives are collected. An additional ex-
ecution is performed without any inserted bug to determine the execution time
in a regular scenario.
Each application’s test suite was executed without any instrumentation as
well to determine the increase of time the instrumentation brings.
Figure 5 shows the different phases of the experiments. First, during the
training phase, the test are executed with the instrumented code. Everytime a
variable is used, the update function of the screener is called in order to update
the accepted values. In addition, the screener uses the pattern detectors to detect
broken patterns. At the end of the execution, both the invariant and the data
collected from the detector are saved. On the operational phase the test cases
are executed with the instrumented code once again. However, this time instead
of monitoring every variable, only the variables that did not have a detected
pattern are observed. On each observation the value is then evaluated by the




















Fig. 5. Workflow of experiments
Injected bugs are of different types to guarantee a more varied input. Some
examples of inserted bugs are:
– Change an operator when assigning values (i.e. change + to −).
– Change a random numeric value.
– Change comparation operator of a conditional clause (i.e. change a > to <
on an if clause).
– Change the value of an argument of a function call.
With this setup the expected results are:
– Value of the reduction obtained in the number of used invariants.
– Comparison of execution times between executions with and without instru-
mentation.
– Accuracy of the error detection with the use of pattern detectors.
4.2 Results
Table 4 shows the number of variables that were trained and the number of
variables that are considered collar variables by the pattern detectors. It is im-
portant to note that only numerical variables are subjected to training, in other
words, only variables of the types int, long, double and float.
Table 4. Variable reduction
Subject Variables trained Collar Variables Reduction
NanoXML 40 17 57.5%
org.jacoco.report 55 28 49.09%
XML-Security 325 164 49.54%
On average, a reduction of 52.04% is achieved with the use of the two pattern
detectors. However the execution time of the program with instrumentation is
also important to take into consideration. Table 5 presents the execution times
of the test suites both with and without instrumentation.
Table 5. Execution time increase
Subject
Execution time with Execution time without
Increase
instrumentation (ms) instrumentation (ms)
NanoXML 270 827 206.3%
org.jacoco.report 3469 5162 48.8%
XML-Security 25005 63088 152.3%
The average increase in the execution time is 135.8%. Although this seems
like a high value, it is greatly impacted by the increase noticed on NanoXML that
is only a few miliseconds.
Having the data on the reduction of variables monitored and execution time
increase, the quality of the error detection is what remains. To test the quality
of the detection using these collar variabes, the number of false positives (Nfp)
and false negatives (Nfn) was determined. A false positive is considered when
the fault screener detects an error in the execution that does not exist. Likewise,
a false negative is counted when a faulty execution has no objections raised from
any fault screener.
Table 6. False positive (fp) and false negative rate (fn)
Subject
Bug 1 Bug 2 Bug 3 Bug 4 Bug 5
fp % fn % fp % fn % fp % fn % fp % fn % fp % fn %
NanoXML 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 66.67 0 0
org.jacoco.report 0 0 3.4 2.13 3.4 0 3.83 2.13 5.96 0
XML-Security 2.81 0.21 13.64 7.14 1.95 0.22 12.99 0.22 0.22 0.22
The results shown on Table 6 were obtained by comparing the total number
of false positives (Nfp) and false negatives (Nfn) with the number of tests on









With an average of 3.21% rate of false positives and 5.26% rate of false
negatives, the rate of these false results is considerably low, especially on the
smaller applications. On the largest application, XML-Security, although having
a higher rate of false results, the worst case scenario detected was a 13.64% fp
and 7.14% fn.
In sum, with only the use of two pattern detectors, the decrease of used
invariants is quite significant and the error detection quality remains very high,
appart from some special cases. In terms of execution time, it may still not be
enough to allow their use on real world markets, but perhaps the creation of
even more detectors could be a solution.
4.3 Threats to Validity
The main threat to the validity of these results is the fact that only three test
subjects were used during the experimentation. Despite these subjects being
real world applications being diverse in both the size of the application (lines of
code) and size of the test suite, the limited number of subjects implies that not
all types of system’s are tested. This means that a system with characteristics
that are completly different might present different results.
Another threat is that the number of injected bugs is not enough to lead to
accurate results, as these bugs might simply be “lucky bugs” that intercept a
collar variable.
Naturally, there are also threats that are based on the implementation of the
invariants, the instrumentation or the pattern detector algorithms themselves.
The reduce these threats, additional testing was made prior to the experimen-
tation to guarantee the quality of the experimental results in this regard.
5 Related Work
Since being introduced, generic invariants have been subject of study along the
years with very different goals in mind. These goals range from study of program
evolution [7, 10], fault detection [2] and fault localization [3, 11]. Invariants have
also been used as an alternative way of error detection on a fault localization
technique known as SFL [4, 9].
Daikon [10] is a tool that reports likely invariants. It runs a program and
then reports the properties observed during the executions. Besides storing pre-
defined invariants like constants, range or linear relationships, it can be extended
by the user with new invariant types. It is compatible with various programming
languages, including C, C++, Java and Pearl.
Carrot [11] is a tool created with the purpose of using generic invariants for
fault localization. It uses a smaller set of invariants then Daikon. The results ob-
tained were negative which lead to the belief that invariants alone are insuficient
as a means of debugging. However, in [9] the use of invariants for fault localiza-
tion was successful when used as the input for the fault localization technique
SFL.
DIDUCE [3] is yet another tool that uses dynamic bitmask invariants. Al-
though it provided “useful” results on four real world applications, the error
that is detected ison a variable that is constant during the training phase and
changed when it was on error detection mode (an error that is easily detected
by a bitmask invariant).
IODINE [12] is a framework for extracting dynamic invariants for hardware
designs. It has been shown that accurate properties can be obtained from using
dynamic invariants.
Zoltar [13] is a tool that applies a fault screener on every occurrence of a
variable and tries to detect errors by finding perturbations on their behavior. In
addition to detecting errors, Zoltar uses the errors detected to help debugging
using SFL.
Another tool that works with fault screeners is PRECIS [14]. PRECIS intro-
duces a different type of invariant based on pre- and post-conditions. The results
obtained suggest the existance of some advantages over Daikon.
iSWAT [15] is a framework that uses invariants for error detection of a hard-
ware level. It uses LLVM to instrument the source code to monitor the store
values.
In [2] various invariants were subjected to performance evaluations. Among
the tested invarants were dynamic range, bitmask, Bloom filters and TBL. Al-
though the results show that bitmask outperforms Bloom filters and dynamic
range, the errors used on the experimentation consisted of random bit switching,
which is better suited for bitmask invariants and are not very common.
On the topic of collar variables, this term was used by Tim Menzies to de-
scribe the subset of variables that affect the output of an application in a mean-
inful way [5].
In [6] the algorithms of TAR3 and TAR4.1 are explained. These algorithms
allow to obtain a ranking of “usefulness” of the different components of an ap-
plication. TAR3 uses the concepts of lift, the change that a decision makes on a
set of examples, and support. TAR4.1 uses Naive Bayes classifiers for the scor-
ing heuristic in order to obtain an overall better performance in comparison to
TAR3.1.
KEYS [16] is yet another algorithm that tries to discover the collar variables,
called keys by the author. It is used to optimize requirement decisions and is
faster then the TAR3 algorithm. In [17], an improved KEYS algorithm is shown
called KEYS2. It outperforms the original version by four orders of magnitude in
terms of speed.
In [18], the concept of collar variable is once again used, this time by the
name of back doors. They were using these back doors to solve CSP/SAT search
problems and suggest by formal analisys the potencial improvement of some
hard problems from an exponential to polynomial time.
6 Conclusions & Future Work
In this paper two simple detectors were used to evaluate what were the collar
variables of each of the systems. Experimenting on real world applications led to
a more accurate take on the impact of the use of invariants for error detection.
By only using two detectors, the reduction of number of invariants used was
above 50% while still maintaining good quality detection. Still the increase in
execution time might still be too severe for use and the inability of the detectors
to view patterns on non numeric values is still an obstacle.
In this regard, for future work in order to reduce the overhead, a further
decrease in the number of invariants used is necessary. The study of additional
detectors that would filter even more variables. Another option is the use of an
algorithm similar to the one used on TAR4.1 [6] to make the decision of what
variables to monitor.
Futher work will also be invested in tackling one of the main issues of the
current approach, the ability to only evaluate numeric variables. Efforts will be
made to use invariants and create detectors that would evaluate patterns for
other variable types like String or char. These variables may prove invaluable
to increasing the effectiveness of this method.
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